After Virtue: Chapters 1-4

         Although Alasdair MacIntyre presents his hypothesis initially as implausible by necessity, it is hard for me to consider the paramaters surrounding his arguments without a proper background in philosophy.  For this reason, I could not necessarily consider the credibility of his contentions from experience.  Rather, MacIntyre’s defense is the sole influence for the inexperienced philosopher.  His initial claim about the idea that modern rival arguments often are based on different values and therefore cannot be rationally solved was a simple yet new conclusion to me. MacIntyre’s claims on emotivism are striking, as they setup his assertion that the language of morality is in disorder.  His distinction of emotivism as a theory of use rather than a theory of meaning, seen in the “7x7 = 49!!” example, explain how emotivism could be rejected by philosophers of the past. MacIntyre claims that today emotivism is not only the most widely accepted platform, but it is also widely considered to be true.  His claims that this misunderstanding is the basis for our current stage of moral despair are plausible and coherent.  It is interesting to read MacIntyre’s book and consider that our current debates on morality may not only be solvable, but that they are also built on a false set of principles.