What sticks out initially in these chapters of After Virtue
are MacIntyre’s comments on Aristotle and his discussion of telos and the good of man. Our discussion in class on the “call no
man happy until he is dead” quote brought us into the following question: How
do we define what human life is or is supposed to be? If accurate time telling
makes a good watch, can we find a functional concept that defines human life in
order to draw conclusions on what makes a good man? In this sense, we were discussing the meaning of life and
how to fulfill life’s purpose.
While the descriptions are vague, as Macintyre notes, it appears to me
as if Aristotle’s claims of eudaimonia as
the “good for man” are more specific than any current arguments. Macintyre’s comment that the educated
moral agent “does what is virtuous because
it is virtuous” therefore answers our earlier questions on intention and
habit. The virtuous person acts in
virtuous ways simply due to a devotion to virtue.
Macintyre’s
first, and admittedly tentative, definition of virtue on page 191 gives a
unique perspective. The concept of
internal goods is interesting.
Macintyre’s claim, or at least the claim that I interpret, says that
virtues give us the means to achieve the good that is inherent in any
particular practice, without the allure of an external good that would blemish
the use of such virtue. His
analogy with chess and candy gives an understandable account of this. This seems difficult, however, in a
world so heavily based on economics and personal financial status. People often say that they love their
job, but money is also a huge factor in how we live. Does the fact that we strive for better income damage our
chances to achieve a virtuous nature?
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