After Virtue: Ch. 5-10: The Individual, Fact, and Explanations of Human Behavior

          MacIntyre methodically demonstrates the disparity between arguments involving factual premises with evaluative conclusions and those that use “man” as a functional concept (as the former does).  Outside of societal/family roles, “man” cannot be used in terms of functional concepts, and therefore the “no ‘ought’ conclusion from ‘is’ premises” principle fails in making moral arguments.  Although this is slightly over my head, it is certainly interesting.  To remove a random individual from all functional concepts that arise from roles is to reduce such an individual to the “modern self.”  It may seem unnerving to think that, today, we often draw conclusions like these.  We create certain functional standards for the human race, and draw moral conclusions when others uphold or neglect such standards.  But are these conclusions 100% wrong? I understand MacIntyre’s hypothesis and I appreciate his assertions, but sometimes I think it may be okay for our methods of moral thinking to change.  In reference to our class discussion, is the prideful person guilty of moral misconduct even if he exhibits humble behavior?  Was Benjamin Franklin moral because he made those virtues habit, or does habit not constitute a purely virtuous person?

            Macintyre’s assertions on experience and scientific knowledge are also intriguing.  Our experiences cannot be deemed as concrete scientific knowledge, since they require validation from theory.  I take from this that a holistic approach is necessary in transition from individual experiences to scientific conclusions.  This is somewhat obvious.  No broad knowledge can be derived from a specific event.  MacIntyre also notes the suggestion following Quine’s position that the inability to remove “beliefs and enjoyments and fears” from the study of human behavior means that no “law-like generalizations” may follow.  It seems backward that we believe theory and experience are a necessary basis for scientific knowledge, yet we also allow moral generalizations to be easily upheld as fact.  Are they not similar concepts? Doesn’t morality have as many gray areas as science?